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1. Motivation and background  
1.1   Motivation 
The robust economic trend in Germany and positive labour market data 
have diverted attention from the fact that fundamental structural 
problems in the financial sector have still to be addressed, not least 
owing to the current financial crisis. Indeed, first steps have already 
been taken towards improving the regulation of the financial sector – 
capital and liquidity requirements are becoming more stringent, the 
incorporation of systemic risks is in preparation under Basel III and the 
first statutory regulations have been laid down to abolish the de facto 
survival guarantee for financial institutions (“too-big to fail”) and to 
ensure bank creditor participation in the event of an imminent 
insolvency. 
However, these initial steps focus on crisis prevention in the financial 
sector – yet the fundamental issue of a reorganisation and 
strengthening of the public-sector segment
1 of the German financial 
industry continues to be unaddressed. This white paper aims to promt a 
discussion of one of the most important segments in our country‟s 
financial infrastructure, namely the Landesbanks and savings banks. 
The real shortcoming is not so much the problematic situation of some 
segments in this sector but rather the absence of a broad debate on the 
desirable structure of this key component of the financial sector in 
Germany. We assume that a topic of such relevance for general 
discussion is not taking place because well-reasoned alternative 
approaches worth openly disputing are simply lacking. Without tangible, 
coherent alternatives, the subject matter is often too complex for many 
who take an active interest to participate meaningfully in the debate.  
The structural model presented here fulfils a range of conditions that we 
presume as given and which can be derived from three main goals, 
namely economic earnings power, a broad offering of financial services 
and overall economic sustainability. In this way, it is possible to ensure 
that a discussion take place on the presented model as a realistic, albeit 
ambitious, alternative to today‟s situation – while leaving the details of 
the design to the political process. At the same time, however, it also 
affords the public a basis of assessment for actual policy decisions 
                                            
1 More precisely, of the financial institutions in federal or municipal ownership. In some 
cases they are currently organised as legal persons under private law.    3 
enacted during this historically decisive phase for the further 
development of the German financial sector.  
Given the partly grave state of political disarray surrounding the bail-out 
and future structure of Landesbanks and the widespread conflicts of 
interest between municipal, state, association, federal policies and 
European competition policy, an open and critical public debate is of 
particular relevance. Taken as a whole, Landesbanks and savings 
banks currently pose a considerable financial risk to the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the public budgets – if, overall, a targeted 
reform of the sector proves unsuccessful. At the same time, however, it 
offers the chance to permanently strengthen the role of the German 
financial industry in an integrated European financial market – provided 
that the necessary measures have been taken in a decisive manner. 
We discuss some versions further below. Based on the foregoing, the 
authors convened for “workshop talks” with the goal of prompting a 
forward-looking reform (debate) for the overall “Landesbanks and 
savings banks” sector in a bid to move away from the currently rather 
haphazard and piecemeal consolidation efforts in behalf of German 
Landesbanks
2. 
1.2   Background 
The sector‟s current situation is highly worrisome, not least because 
fundamental structural changes affecting Landesbanks impacted by the 
state aid investigation have been dictated by Brussels but have yet to 
be implemented. Moreover, savings banks and the Federal States are 
still planning to retreat from their ownership in most of the Landes-
banks.  
Also looming large are substantial burdens arising from the 
implementation of a number of regulatory changes, above all Basel III, 
the bank levy and a deposit guarantee scheme reform. 
At present, major segments of the Landesbanks sector have neither a 
sustainable business model nor economically viable income or balance 
sheet structures. The burden on Landesbanks stemming from financial 
assistance and from costs for government guarantees is very high. In 
so far as the Federal States have injected equity capital, this may be 
considered a form of economic subsidisation of the current profit and 
loss account, as distributions cannot be anticipated in the foreseeable 
future. Roughly 10% interest must be paid on any silent participation. 
                                            
2 The discussion surrounding the merger of West LB and Bayern LB in early autumn 
2010 serves here as a case in point.   4 
The likelihood of reducing the resulting charges is remote. If the silent 
participations were converted into equity or share capital, the risk 
position of the owners would increase as it would then be treated as 
core capital. 
Several Landesbanks have been kept afloat – in some cases for years 
– by substantial government support predicated on the “too big to fail” 
argument. Such a situation – as in the case where assistance was 
provided for a number of heavily indebted privately organised banks – 
has resulted in a distortion of the competitive environment in the 
German banking landscape. This is exacerbated by the burden that 
directly results from the extensive use of tax money to bail out public 
and private banks. 
At first glance, the municipal savings banks appear stable and seem to 
be unscathed by the crisis at large Landesbanks. However, this is true 
only to a certain degree. On the one hand, they – and hence their 
municipal owners – are indirectly owners
3 of the Landesbanks via the 
regional savings banks associations and are thus proportionately liable 
for their losses to the extent that any liability (still) exists. On the other 
hand, savings banks hold, to a large extent, claims against 
Landesbanks, with figures cited in the three-digit billion range. Should 
further write-downs on the values assigned to their ownership interests 
be required, the stability of numerous savings banks would be at risk. 
Against the backdrop of this problematic and complex situation, it is 
possible for a confidence crisis to develop rapidly. Thus, there is 
considerable pressure to take action, which is further exacerbated by 
the restrictions imposed by the EU. Now is the time to take suitable 
precautions in order to protect the public owners (Federal States and 
municipalities), the German economy and the German consumers, too. 
The current economic upswing affords the opportunity to undertake the 
necessary fundamental structural reforms. A reform of the Landesbanks 
and savings banks in Germany – as well as the streamlining of 
distressed private banks – will be decisive for the question whether 
Germany is able to eliminate the prevailing structural risks in the 
                                            
3 For historical reasons their ownership interest (as of mid-2009) is typically 50%, with 
the remaining 50% held by the relevant Federal States. A similar ownership interest 
has been essentially maintained at Nord LB, LB Bremen (as subsidiary of Nord LB) 
and West LB. By contrast, the ownership interest of savings bank associations in 
LBBW has been reduced to 40.5%, and likewise reduced to a 15% interest in Saar 
LB, 6% in Bayern LB and 5.3% in HSH. Only Helaba and LB Berlin present a 
different picture. Whereas the association‟s ownership share in Helaba increased to 
85%, LBB was 98% taken over by means of a complex arrangement by the German 
Savings Banks Association.   5 
financial sector and thus also stave off a repeat of the current financial 
crisis.  
2. The interconnectedness of savings banks and 
Landesbanks  
 
It is a matter of public record that key segments of the German 
Landesbanks lack a stable and self-sustaining business model and 
have neither a sustainable, robust income structure nor a resilient 
balance sheet. In particular, the refinancing of Landesbanks following 
the abolition of state guarantees (“Anstaltslast und und Gewähr-
trägerhaftung”)is still unresolved, as neither the interbank market nor 
the capital market makes funds available on reasonable terms. This has 
resulted in a significant shrinkage of the balance sheet for individual 
Landesbanks - a process which is far from being complete. The final 
outcome of the state aid investigation and resulting restructuring 
requirements is still to a large extent open for the Landesbanks 
concerned. Fact remains that the balance sheet total needs to be 
roughly halved, while the balance sheet has to be adjusted for non-
performing loans and securities as well as non-strategic business units. 
An isolated examination of the Landesbanks falls decidedly short of the 
mark, however, as the problematic situation of the Landesbanks as a 
whole cannot be properly appreciated without taking into account its 
specific environment, close economic interconnectedness and cross-
liabilities. In addition to the ownership structures – savings banks today 
still contribute to the liable capital to a significant degree – the role of 
savings banks as creditors and ultimate economic providers of the 
guarantee scheme of the savings banks and Landesbanks is central to 
the further examination. The following facts are relevant for the 
discussion of a new Landesbanks and savings banks structure that is 
geared towards system stability. 
Although the savings banks‟ business model has weathered the 
financial crisis decidedly better than that of Landesbanks, it is not 
altogether free from weaknesses. The operating result is highly 
dependent on the maturity transformation and on the net result from 
own funds. The withdrawal of the ECB‟s crisis-related expansionary 
money market and liquidity policies, coupled with the associated 
flattening of the yield curve, will presumably have significant negative 
repercussions on net operating interest income of the Landesbanks and 
savings banks.   6 
Savings banks have material excess funds, leading to considerable 
investment pressure on the asset side, which used to be resolved via 
deposits at Landesbanks. Following the abolition of state guarantees for 
Landesbanks, major solvency problems have arisen in a number of 
cases that particularly impact savings banks in their position as 
creditors vis-à-vis Landesbanks. The continued existence of substantial 
financial risks resulting from the state guarantees, although abolished 
as of 2005, puts an additional strain on the situation. The state 
guarantee expires in 2015 and at present is still expected to represent a 
three-digit billion figure. In addition, a major portion of the subordinated 
capital of Landesbanks was subscribed by the savings banks. 
The high reliance of savings banks on interest income is evidence that 
risk diversification of revenue sources is widely absent. Commission 
income continues to consist by and large of commissions on payment 
transactions and account management; in both of these areas 
competition (free account management) and EU legal requirements will 
permanently reduce revenue. 
There will be increased competitive pressure in savings bank-
dominated market segments (private banking and SMEs). The private 
banking sector is largely consolidated through the merger of Unicredit 
and HVB, Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank and 
Postbank. There are also formidable competitors from other countries 
(ING, Santander/SEB, and Credit Mutuel/Targobank) whose private-
client-focussed business models in their respective home markets have 
clearly demonstrated their ability to succeed in these market segments. 
The strategic capacity of savings banks and savings banks associations 
has been significantly impacted in recent years.  
Alongside the noted burden arising from their role as creditors for the 
Landesbanks, legacies from past consolidation efforts severely limit the 
flexibility of the organisation as a whole. The acquisition of LBB not only 
leads to a considerable volume of additional write-downs at the savings 
banks but also makes it more difficult to effect any meaningful structural 
change that includes LBB as long as the write-downs have not been 
recognised. In this setting, the step towards a full takeover of 
DekaBank, which is a strategically desirable move for the savings 
banks, in and of itself becomes a severe test for the entire savings 
banks organisation. 
At the savings banks there is no conceptually unified, sustainable 
concept discernible for the structure of the Landesbanks. For the most 
part, the savings banks seem to be intent on losing no time in retreating 
from all responsibility for financial burdens associated with their   7 
commitment as owners and creditors vis-à-vis Landesbanks. The 
willingness and capacity of savings banks to use financial resources for 
such a dissociation process is objectively limited. This will have 
repercussions on the alternative courses of action to be pursued. 
Savings banks, Landesbanks and regional building societies are 
integrated via various support funds into a joint liability scheme that 
guarantees the existence of the financial institutions and hence their 
clients‟ deposits. In a crisis situation, a multi-tiered liability cascade 
regulates financial support. According to the current system, savings 
banks and Landesbanks are liable to one another. Following the 
abolition of state guarantees, the quality and economic performance of 
such an institutional protection scheme no longer meets the 
requirements.
4 Neither the funding of guarantee schemes nor the 
guarantee pool is likely to be sufficient to bail out even a single larger 
Landesbank.  
Based on experience from the financial crisis, the EU plans to 
reorganise deposit guarantee schemes across Europe.
5 The savings 
banks would like to be exempt from this regulation by virtue of the 
existing institutional protection scheme. If the preservation of the 
savings banks‟ institutional protection scheme and exemption from 
inclusion in a newly created deposit guarantee scheme become subject 
to the condition that the Landesbanks exit the joint liability scheme of 
the savings banks, this would have far-reaching consequences for their 
credit rating. Independently of this, the question arises whether today‟s 
institutional protection scheme is still applicable to Landesbanks, which 
are almost exclusively owned by Federal States. Moreover, those 
savings banks, which balance their books in accordance with GAAP 
accounting rules, have an accounting advantage over Landesbanks, 
which report according to IFRS. The comparatively solid financial 
performance of savings banks from 2007 to 2009 is mainly, albeit not 
exclusively, driven by write-downs on fixed assets that were either not 
at all or only partly required under GAAP. In the end, the burden 
resulting from a fair value assessment is borne by the Landesbanks but 
not – or at least not to the same extent – by the savings banks.  
The foregoing considerations lead to the conclusion that a one-
dimensional approach to a future-oriented reorganisation of the 
                                            
4 The same of course applies to deposit guarantee schemes of private and co-
operative banks. 
5 EU Commission draft directive dated 12/7/2010 KOM(2010) 368/2.   8 
Landesbanks in Germany is simply not practicable. First, the need for a 
fundamental structural change also holds true for the savings bank 
sector. Second, due to the interconnectedness of Landesbanks and 
savings banks, only a collective, future-oriented reorganisation is 
meaningful. The debate on reform must therefore be extended to 
encompass the entire “Landesbanks and savings banks” sector. 
3. Basic considerations for the reorganisation of savings 
banks and Landesbanks 
 
Irrespective of the concrete legal organisational structure, a 
restructuring of the Landesbanks and savings banks in Germany will 
need to satisfy a number of basic “objective” requirements in order to be 
economically viable, legally feasible and politically acceptable. The last-
mentioned criterion pertains to the ownership structure of the 
Landesbanks and savings banks, without whose positive – if not to say 
enthusiastic – co-operation a concrete reform proposal has no chance 
to succeed. We identify three such basic requirements: the 
development of a sustainable, future-oriented business model, the 
creation of permanent ownership structures and the promotion of 
competitive structures in the banking market. 
 
3.1  Business model 
As noted in the introductory section, the majority of the Landesbanks 
currently have neither a sustainable business model nor economically 
viable income or balance sheet structures. Failing access to the broad 
retail market, the Landesbanks have frequently focussed on specific 
market segments, for which a network of branch offices is not a 
prerequisite, or else they have expanded abroad. The previous 
competitive edge in wholesale banking derived from the comparatively 
very favourable refinancing terms via the state guarantees, the abolition 
of which resulted in margins no longer comfortable compared to private 
national and international competitors. A straightforward expansion of 
the business model that would open access to the retail business has 
proved barely sustainable to date given the competition with savings 
banks, which are (indirectly) owners of the Landesbanks. There have 
been some notable exceptions to date, mainly in the operating area of 
the Federal State of Berlin, in Frankfurt am Main, in Baden-
Württemberg and in Braunschweig.   9 
Accordingly, the restructuring of the Landesbanks sector is anything but 
an inherently solvable task. Redistributing and/or shrinking volumes 
and/or functions alone will not lead to the emergence of new 
competitive units. Only when a sustainable business model for 
Landesbanks has been devised will there be renewed interest in taking 
over an entrepreneurial role for these banks. 
The wholesale business of the Landesbanks is generally regarded as 
tending to be opportunistic and highly capital market-dependent, seizing 
upon individual opportunities but falling short of systematically covering 
or developing a market. For this reason as well, the business is 
particularly prone to volatility. A restructuring of the sector therefore 
must lead above all to the development of a business portfolio that is 
sufficiently diversified, with corresponding profitability and a reasonable 
risk profile. 
The integration of savings banks may be accomplished in a different 
way, as set out further below. Savings banks provide a natural 
extension to Landesbanks through their private and corporate client 
business (notably in the retail but also SME sector); they offer stable 
and competitive refinancing, by means of which liquidity and profitability 
may be improved. Direct or indirect access to the retail banking market 
and SME credit business results in improved diversification and more 
stable revenues while minimising the reliance on money and capital 
markets. Conversely, the ties with Landesbanks enable savings banks 
to systematically expand in the upper medium-sized business sector 
and support companies through a growth and internationalisation 
process. 
This invites the conclusion that a form of verticalisation is necessary for 
the restructuring of the Landesbanks. The goal of tying the business 
models of Landesbanks and savings banks in this way, however, is not 
to subsidise the weaknesses of one side with the strengths of the other. 
The tie-up is aimed rather at securing – by means of balanced business 
and balance sheet structures – a structural contribution to the 
microeconomic compensation of risk and hence to financial market 
stability. It is therefore probable for the whole to be more stable than the 
sum of its parts. For the moment, the issue of which legal organisational 
form this verticalisation should take remains open. At this juncture it 
suffices to elucidate the conceivable alternatives, ranging from stable 
contractually agreed cooperations through to a legal merger.  
   10 
3.2  Governance / Owners 
Past experience has shown that savings banks and the Federal States 
have pursued a variety of business strategy interests in their capacity 
as owners of the Landesbanks. Since the financial crisis, however, both 
owner groups have been equally intent on retreating from their 
responsibility vis-à-vis Landesbanks. Nevertheless, a further 
development of the Landesbanks is conceivable only if their owners are 
in the position and willing to abide by their entrepreneurial 
responsibilities and provide the Landesbanks with the equity capital 
they need in order to ensure their risk bearing capacity and growth. This 
holds particularly true against the backdrop of the increased capital 
requirements under Basel III.  
The foregoing considerations evince a second requirement: A 
separation of both owner groups should take place if the conflicts of 
interest that were clearly apparent in the past are to be avoided. The 
goal should be that financial institutions emerge from a structural reform 
with a clear strategic orientation that aligns with that of their owners, i.e. 
financial institutions that are owned either by the municipalities and/or 
savings banks associations, on the one hand, or by the Federal States 
on the other. Therefore, the separation of responsibilities within the 
savings banks and Landesbank sector must be radically rethought. In 
the interest of financial stability – but also of the owners and taxpayers 
– an improvement in risk management, as well as in the internal and 
external control of public banks, is indispensible.  
 
3.3  Competition 
As competitors, Landesbanks fulfil an important function for the German 
economy. They hold market shares of between 20% and 40% in the 
mid- and large cap, commercial real estate and project financing, as 
well as municipal and state credit business. Accordingly, they are 
important partners for companies, commercial real estate and 
institutional clients, not to mention municipalities, states and the federal 
government. Compared to other market participants, they are also 
prepared to carry risks on their balance sheet and not transfer these to 
other players. Were it not for the Landesbanks, competition in key 
market areas would be severely hampered in the wake of the 
consolidation of commercial banks that has already taken place. This 
being so, it simply cannot be the goal, from a competitive point of view, 
to abolish the Landesbanks.  
A consolidation of the Landesbanks„ and savings banks„ activities under 
a single roof would create a bank with a balance sheet ranking among   11 
the largest in Europe, surpassing even that of Deutsche Bank. Such a 
concentration of banks in Europe‟s largest and most important economy 
would not be desirable in terms of competition policy, is hardly likely to 
be authorised by the European anti-trust authorities and would not be 
possible to finance. In light of the foregoing, it likewise cannot be the 
objective from a competition point of view to simply merge the 
Landesbanks into a single bank. 
In keeping with this, a politically viable reform of the Landesbanks and 
savings banks in our view entails a consolidation that does nothing to 
reduce competition in the financial market but everything to strengthen 
it instead. This involves the notion that the desired financial institutions 
of the future are large enough and sufficiently diversified to assume at 
some point an active role in the European market as well. 
Competitiveness defined in this way opens up growth opportunities for 
the financial institution not only in its regional market as it exists today 
but also reaching beyond to encompass the national and international 
market.
6  
4. Proposed model 
 
The general requirements outlined in Section 3 may in principle be 
combined with a large diversity of reform concepts. From among a 
multitude of conceivable models, we would like to present – on the 
basis of the stated basic requirements – a new structural model that 
features a clear division of labour while at the same time providing for a 
bundling of forces. For the sake of simplicity, the proposed model shall 
be referred to as the tripartite model in that it gives rise to three new 
types of financial institutions alongside which the traditional (municipal) 
savings banks will continue to exist.  
In addition to the savings banks, the basic components of the tripartite 
model consist of the following: several Sparkassenregionalinstitute 
(SRIs) [regionally integrated public banks], a Sparkassenzentralinstitut 
(SZI) [national financial service institution] and a number of 
Landesförderbanken (LFBs) [state development banks]. DekaBank and 
Landesbanks are either wholly or partly assimilated by the three stated 
                                            
6 Comparable financial institutions in other countries have successfully entered the 
competition in Europe for some time now and have seen gains in market share as a 
result. Examples include the competitors of other countries, such as financial 
institutions in Italy, Spain and France.    12 
components. Thanks to the redistribution of responsibilities, existing 
overlap is eliminated.  
For example, currently existing Landesbanks will be split into three 
parts and assigned to the newly established financial institutions (cf. 
Chart 1). This means that the retail business of a Landesbank will be 
integrated into one of the newly created Sparkassenregionalinstitute 
[regionally integrated public banks]. At the same time, any existing 
Verbund business (joint business) within a Landesbank will be 
incorporated into the Sparkassenzentralinstitut. Thirdly, and lastly, all 
unsustainable business segments will be either phased out or 
transferred to a bad bank. This is based on the assumption that a sale 
or initial public offering is not practicable for Landesbanks with their 
traditional business model as wholesale banks and that only a 
divestment of Landesbank segments is feasible, as a number of 
examples have already demonstrated.  
Chart 1: Split of Landesbanks 
 
4.1.  Sparkassenregionalinstitute (SRIs)  
The integration of savings banks and Landesbanks
7 within a single 
metropolitan area gives rise to a small number of 
Sparkassenregionalinstitute [regionally integrated public banks]. On a 
supra-regional level, these financial institutions conduct their retail 
banking, mid- and large cap, project finance, capital market, municipal 
and real estate financing business, as well as special funds business for 
institutional investors. Their retail banking, as well as business with 
                                            
7 Strictly speaking, this refers only to the Landesbank‟s direct client business, i.e. in 
particular the mid- and large cap business.   13 
smaller and medium-sized enterprises, on the other hand, is performed 
on a regional level within the operating area of the integrated savings 
banks. By contrast, the SRIs transfer the Verbund business services, 
including building society, mutual fund and leasing activities, to the SZI.  
These financial institutions will be characterised by a better risk 
diversification vis-à-vis the status quo. Above all, they provide for a 
more balanced asset/liability management. The vertical structure allows 
for a broader range of products, including internationally operating 
medium-sized businesses (wholesale) while at the same time promoting 
broad-based access to client business (retail). 
The new regional banks are formed from the tie-up of Landesbanks and 
savings banks, preferably on a regional level. This can be achieved by 
exploiting Germany's distinct economic structure with its metropolitan 
areas of Hamburg/Bremen, Berlin, Cologne/Dusseldorf, Hanover, 
Frankfurt/Rhein-Main, Stuttgart/Rhein-Neckar and Munich. As regards 
the Landesbanks, activities with development potential in the mid- and 
large-cap segment, including other segments, will be transferred to the 
new SRIs. 
Regional banks will play a pivotal role in the further development of 
these metropolitan areas. In contrast to the current situation, the 
savings banks and Landesbank sector will initially operate as a regional 
savings finance group, as it were, and later as a supra-regional S-
Finanzgruppe [S-financial group]. The integrated business model of a 
Sparkassenregionalinstitut [regionally integrated public bank] is strongly 
focussed on the direct client business and is able to dispense with 
speculative investments. A balanced relationship between the client and 
capital market business goes a long way to ensure the earnings power 
and hence the growth of these financial institutions over the long term. 
This also secures a high rating.  
For the Landesbanks such a solution would necessitate spinning off the 
legacies and non-strategic activities, as well surplus in personnel, into a 
bad bank, the risk of which remains with the previous owner. However, 
another possibility would be a sale or reduction on the part of 
Landesbanks in their own right. The existing integrated business 
models at LBBW, LBB, Helaba and NordLB lend themselves to further 
development with the possibility of creating new SRIs in the other 
metropolitan areas. However, the emergence of such regional cluster is 
also conceivable through the merger of savings banks (even without the 
participation of one of today‟s Landesbanks). The SRIs essentially 
belong to the municipalities and municipal associations. Alternatively to 
a metropolitan area based business model or as a long-term   14 
development model, supra-regional business models are as in other 
European countries (e.g. Italy, Spain, Austria) also possible in the event 
of an abolition of the regional principle.  
The creation of integrated business models leads to competitive units 
for the private and corporate client business that are able to hold their 
own in intra-European competition with access to the capital market. 
Several such regional clusters should be created in order to fulfil the 
second basic requirement, namely competition. These could constitute 
an effective competitive corrective to the private commercial banking 
sector. 
Chart 2: Functions and components of SRIs 
 
4.2.  Sparkassenzentralinstitut (SZI) 
The underlying premise is the creation of a Sparkassenzentralinstitut 
(SZI) [national financial service institution] centrally providing the 
Verbund business (joint business) for the savings banks and newly 
created SRIs. This business includes proprietary and client securities 
business, syndicated lending, payment transactions, mutual fund 
offerings, closed funds and certificates, leasing and consumer loans as 
well as building society and insurance business. Within the framework 
of a holding solution, regional building societies are thus integrated into 
the SZI in the same way as DekaBank and other banks with Verbund 
business, such as insurance companies under state or municipal 
ownership that are already assigned to the savings banks group at 
present. In these business segments there will be only one product 
provider within the savings banks organisation, allowing economies of 
scale to be fully exploited.   15 
Chart 3: Functions and components of the SZI 
 
Therefore, it is necessary, among other things, to adjust the ownership 
structures at DekaBank and transfer DekaBank to the sole ownership of 
the savings banks. DekaBank and other banks of the S-Finanzgruppe 
[savings banks financial group] that are owned by the savings banks 
may represent the nucleus of the Sparkassenzentralinstitut [national 
financial service institution].  
The business model of the Sparkassenzentralinstitut is sustainable, as 
it encompasses the Verbund business with the savings banks and 
regional banks, as well as the associated indirect access to the retail 
market. This provides for a balanced business portfolio. As a holding 
company, the Sparkassenzentralinstitut is the exclusive responsibility of 
the savings banks and savings banks associations. 
 
4.3.  Landesförderbanken (LFBs) 
For the Landesbanks, for which integration into a regional savings or 
Sparkassenzentralinstitut [national financial service institution] is not a 
viable option, the only remaining possibility is an orderly winding down, 
as purely wholesale banks may not be sold or listed on the stock 
exchange. A conceivable alternative to directly winding down the banks 
is perhaps to streamline them down to activities approved under the 
Agreement II (“Verständigung II”) or a merger with the public sector 
development banks of the Federal States. The "competitive business" 
may be sold off, and the legacies – in keeping with the previous 
ownership structures – may be transferred to a bad bank, which 
implements the orderly winding down as agency within an agency 
(publicly owned special purpose vehicle). In this way the main problems   16 
of an orderly winding down, namely the reduction of personnel and 
safeguarding public employee pension benefits, are thereby resolved. 
The newly formed Landesförderbanken [state development banks] have 
a clear development mandate under the Agreement II (“Verständigung 
II”) and are under the sole ownership of the Federal States. On the 
basis of the public legal framework and under the ownership of the 
Federal States, they have good access to the money and capital 
markets and are able to fulfil the development tasks of the Federal 
States. However, they need to be subject to effective monitoring by their 
state sponsor. Liability for the wind-down facility (“bad bank”) of the 
Landesbanks (e.g. agency within an agency) must be taken over by the 
legacy owners of the (former) Landesbanks on a pro rata basis and 
cannot rest solely with the Federal States. 
4.4.   Overview of the proposed model 
Sparkassen
Sparkassen, die sich keinem SRI angeschlossen haben
Funktionen:
Retail/Private-Banking, Mittelstandsgeschäft
Träger: Kommunen
SRIs
Entstehen aus:
Verschmelzung von Landesbankteilen 
mit Sparkassen des Ballungsraums
Funktionen:
- Retailbanking, Mittelstand und 
Großkunden
- Projektfinanzierung und 
Kapitalmarktgeschäft   
(kundenfokussiert)
- Kommunal- und 
Immobilienfinanzierungsgeschäft
Träger:
Kommunen und kommunale Verbände
SZI
Entsteht aus:
Verbindung von Deka, LBS, 
Landesbankenteilen, Versicherungen
Funktionen:
Verbundleistungen für die SRIs 
und die nicht SRI-gebundenen 
Sparkassen
Träger: 
Holding im Eigentum der Sparkassen 
und Sparkassenverbände
LFBs
LandesförderBanken
Funktionen:  
Fördergeschäft nach 
Verständigung II, 
ggfs. auch für 
Abwicklung,Verwertung, 
Verkauf von nicht 
zukunftsfähigen 
Teilen der 
Landesbanken 
(z.B. AidA)
Träger:  
Länder, aber Haftung für 
die Abwicklungslasten 
entsprechend der 
Eigentumsstrukturen 
der Landesbank (alt)
Chart 4: Tripartite model consisting of SRIs, SZI and LFBs 
 
4.5.  Open organisational issues  
The three reform components – SZI, SRIs, LFBs – complement one 
another; their implementation would constitute a „big bang‟ for the   17 
German financial industry. In our view, positive growth impetus is a 
realistic possibility not only for the overall economy but for the financial 
industry as well. On the longer term, we expect the proposed reform 
model to provide a strong boost to financial competition in Germany. 
This is particularly so if, following the formation of competitive regional 
banks, the regional principle, which continues to enjoy public law 
guarantees to this day, should be restricted or entirely eliminated. 
However, there are formidable obstacles standing in the way of the 
implementation of our reform model some of which are addressed in the 
following section. It will take no little imagination and a strong political 
will to tackle and overcome these hurdles in a structured manner. We 
believe these challenges can be overcome within a reasonable period 
of time if such political will is at hand.  
One major obstacle consists in the complex ownership structures of 
financial institutions under federal or municipal ownership. This is 
further exacerbated by the fact that the interests of the savings banks 
are bundled in regional associations, which in turn have their own legal 
personality and in particular undertake special functions while pursuing 
their own interests. If the restructuring proposal presented in this paper 
is to have a chance, all parties concerned must be convinced that it is to 
their advantage to participate in the restructuring process. This applies 
to the owners of Landesbanks, i.e. in particular to the Federal States 
and associations, including their owners, as well as the savings banks 
themselves. Consequently, for each of the parties concerned it is 
important to examine the degree to which the relevant situation stands 
to improve as the result of a „big bang‟ – be it that individual expected 
losses are reduced or that positive courses of action may result.  
However, a system of compensation payments should make it 
fundamentally possible for all parties concerned to improve their 
position and thus prevent a veto posture on the part of individual parties 
involved. Since the overall solution strengthens the competitive 
performance of the financial sector as a whole while stabilising it at the 
same time, there also exists at least in principle a net capital gain 
calculated across all parties concerned to be distributed more or less 
equitably by means of the system of compensation payments. For 
example, a way must be found for municipalities as owners of the 
savings banks to integrate the latter into an SRI. There are various 
solutions to choose from, including those already implemented in other   18 
European countries in comparable situations and whose results can be 
relied upon for an assessment of alternatives
8.  
The compensation payments required for the formation of the SRIs and 
SZI need to be financed. For example, the question arises as to how 
the savings banks and associations will finance the missing shares in 
the banks that are integrated into the SZI. Solutions need to be found 
that do not necessarily entail raising additional capital on the part of the 
owners. Intelligent participation models may be a conceivable solution, 
too. In our view the elaboration of a corresponding financing and 
participation strategy is a challenging – albeit manageable – task.  
We have not given due consideration to two other challenges so as not 
to find ourselves mired in a maze of topics and as a result put off the 
development of a proposed solution to the Landesbank problem. First, 
we have not examined legal issues, in particular the question of the 
public mandate of savings banks and Landesbanks, as well as rules 
and regulations from the Federal State-specific rights of savings banks. 
These topics merit deeper investigation as they could have a 
considerable impact on the above-mentioned requirements. Second, we 
have not looked into the issue of a meaningful, i.e. lastingly viable and 
at the same time credible guarantee scheme for savings banks and 
Landesbanks.  
All of the topics addressed in this section – ownership structures and 
compensation payments, their financing and related legal issues, as 
well as the reform of guarantee schemes – are indeed relevant; even 
so, they are secondary in importance to the fundamental structural 
issue that is the focus of interest in this white paper. 
5. Recommended course of action  
 
In the previous sections of this white paper we outlined in brief a 
possible structure for the entire savings banks and Landesbank sector, 
leaving aside a few relevant issues. This draft fulfils the basic 
requirements, set forth at the outset, for a desirable reform of this 
segment of the public law financial system. Given today‟s prevailing 
banking structure, these requirements cover 1) the verticalisation of the 
banking sector, 2) the clear allocation of ownership rights to a (public) 
                                            
8 Alongside a wide variety of approaches adopted in Italy, Spain and France, other 
different innovative options are also conceivable. We shall not pursue these 
considerations further in this study.   19 
body and 3) the protection or improvement of competition in the market 
for financial services.  
As to the course of action going forward – and in order to put the 
discussion on a socio-political legitimate track – we recommend the 
establishment of a government commission with a corresponding 
mandate to develop a proposal ready for implementation with regard to 
the restructuring of the entire public law financial sector, or at least the 
savings banks and Landesbanks. This proposal is to be submitted 
within a clearly established timeframe and on the basis of a clearly 
defined government agenda.  
We regard the reform proposal presented in this paper as a contribution 
to the formulation of the objectives and agenda for this government 
commission. If it should be decided to set up an enquête commission 
instead of a government commission, the report is to be presented to 
the parliament. In either case the members of the commission are to be 
appointed by the mandating authority – i.e. government or parliament – 
and authorised with a mandate for their task. Stakeholders, such as 
representatives of the associations, savings banks or Landesbanks, 
should be consulted by the commission but should not be members of 
it.  
The results of this commission‟s work will serve as a conspicuous and 
pro-active strategy in response to the long-standing reproaches on the 
part of the European Commission. The implementation of this strategy 
will permanently preserve the savings banks and Landesbanks sector 
as a formidable force within Germany while laying the foundations for 
such a position within Europe. Accordingly, we are convinced that 
keeping the discussion initiated here alive should rank high on the 
political agenda, particularly in the light of imminent burdens on state 
budgets in the absence of fundamental reforms. WORKING PAPERS 
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